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From “Reliability” to Uncertainty
DIFFICULTIES INHERENT IN INTERPRETING AND
APPLYING THE NEW CRAWFORD STANDARD
Paul L. Shechtman †
My family once lived across the street from a nut
wholesaler in lower Manhattan. Late one night, I saw a man
crawling out of a broken window in the building, dragging
behind him bags of nuts. I immediately reached for the
telephone, dialed 911, and described what I was seeing. The
operator interrupted my report with a few questions to
establish the building’s location and the details of the man’s
clothing. As we spoke, the thief hurried up the street with his
prize.
Suffice it to say the burglar was not caught. What if he
had been? Was my 911 call “testimonial” as that term is used
in Crawford v. Washington? 1 Would it matter if the 911
operator had been trained by the Police Department’s detective
bureau? Does it matter that I am familiar with the hearsay
rule? What if I had shouted the description to my wife, and not
the 911 operator?
As my real-life example suggests (and the hypotheticals
propounded by Professor Robert Pitler at the Brooklyn Law
School symposium confirm), Crawford is a law professor’s
dream and a trial judge’s nightmare. The familiar framework
of Ohio v. Roberts 2 is gone and in its place is a mode of analysis
that is exceedingly difficult to apply, at least until the Supreme
Court provides further guidance. For now, the best that I can
offer are a few observations about the changes that Crawford
has brought and the uncertainty that has followed in its wake.
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1
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
2
448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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BEFORE CRAWFORD: THE ROBERTS “RELIABILITY”
STANDARD

Undoubtedly, there was something intellectually
unsatisfying about Ohio v. Roberts 3, a case which one court
aptly described as the “‘Sistine Chapel’ of obiter dicta.” 4
Roberts taught that hearsay was constitutionally admissible in
a criminal trial if it fell within a “firmly rooted hearsay
exception”
or
bore
“particularized
guarantees
of
5
trustworthiness.” The result was a near congruence between
the Confrontation Clause and the Federal Rules of Evidence. If
an extrajudicial statement was admissible under the Rules, it
was almost certainly admissible under the Confrontation
Clause. And if it was inadmissible under the Rules, it was
almost certainly constitutionally inadmissible as well. It was
as if the Framers had been prescient enough to write the
Federal Rules of Evidence into the Sixth Amendment.
II.

CRAWFORD AND THE MEANING OF “TESTIMONIAL”

For all its intellectual shortcomings, Roberts, I believe,
asked the right question: was the out-of-court statement
sufficiently reliable that it could be admitted in a criminal trial
untested by cross-examination? Crawford, of course, tells us
that reliability is not the touchstone – that “[a]dmitting
statements deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at
odds
with
the
right
to
confrontation . . . [which]
commands . . . that reliability be assessed . . . by testing in the
crucible of cross-examination.” 6 That language might be read
to mean that all hearsay is constitutionally inadmissible in a
criminal trial. Crawford’s holding, however, is not so sweeping.
Rather, the case holds that the Confrontation Clause excludes
testimonial statements of witnesses who are absent from trial,
except (i) where the declarant is unavailable and the defendant
has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine him, 7 (ii) the

3

Id.
People v. White, 555 N.E.2d 1241, 1252 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), aff’d sub nom.
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
5
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
6
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
7
Id. at 59.
4

2005]

FROM “RELIABILITY” TO UNCERTAINTY

307

defendant has forfeited his right to confront the witness 8 or (iii)
perhaps if the statement is a testimonial dying declaration. 9
Once reliability is abandoned as the focus of
Confrontation Clause analysis, we are adrift. Crawford offers
three potential definitions of testimonial: (i) “statements that
declarants
would
reasonably
expect
to
be
used
prosecutorially”; 10 (ii) “‘extrajudicial statements . . . contained
in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits,
depositions, prior testimony, or confessions’” 11; or (iii)
“‘statements . . . made under circumstances which would lead
an objective witness . . . to believe the statement would be
available for use at a later trial.’” 12 Although Justice Scalia
posits that these formulations “share a common nucleus,” 13
they differ greatly. Consider my excited utterance to the 911
operator. Under the second formulation (that advanced by
Justice Thomas in White v. Illinois), 14 the statement is
constitutionally admissible, since it is not “formalized
testimonial material.” 15 The first and third formulations are
more difficult to apply. I suppose that I reasonably expected
that my utterance would be used “prosecutorially,” if that
phrase means “used to arrest the perpetrator.” But would an
objective observer reasonably believe that the statement would
be available for use at a later trial? As I shouted into the
telephone, I never considered a later trial. And whether an
observer hearing my statement would anticipate its use at trial
would seem to depend on what the observer knew about
criminal trial practice.

8
9
10

Id. at 62.
Id. at 56 n.6.
Id. at 51 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 23, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No. 02-

9410)).
11
Id. at 51-52 (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas,
J., concurring)) (alteration in original).
12
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 (quoting Brief for the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers et. al. in Support of Petitioner at 3, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36
(No. 02-9410)).
13
Id.
14
White, 502 U.S. 346, 362-63, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“As a
matter of plain language . . . it is difficult to see how or why the [Confrontation] Clause
should apply to hearsay evidence as a general proposition.”).
15
Id. at 365.
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THE NEW CRAWFORD STANDARD: SHAKY FOUNDATION,
UNCLEAR CONSEQUENCES

The questions raised by Crawford are obvious: Is the
standard objective or subjective? If the declarant is a child,
does one ask whether a reasonable child would expect later
trial use? Is the test prosecutorial use or trial use? For me, it
is impossible to answer these questions unless one knows the
reason for asking them. Is our goal to make criminal trials in
the 21st century mimic those in 1787? Is it to prevent Sir
Walter Raleigh’s case from repeating itself on our shores? Is it
to develop a formal definition that best captures those
instances in which the declarant sees himself (or perhaps
others see him) as “bearing witness”? Or is it to ensure that
defendants are not convicted on the basis of untrustworthy
hearsay? As Professor Park said at the symposium, it is
difficult to develop a coherent confrontation clause
jurisprudence – i.e., a definition of testimonial – unless “we
know what we are trying to accomplish.”
Much of Justice Scalia’s opinion is devoted to
demonstrating that Roberts was amorphous and unpredictable.
What he actually shows is that prosecutors and lower courts
were remarkably adept at finding ways to admit accomplice
confessions, despite the plurality’s admonition in Lilly v.
Virginia that it was “highly unlikely” that any such statement
could survive Confrontation Clause scrutiny. 16 If the Crawford
Court had held that accomplice confessions were per se
unreliable, much of the unpredictability of Roberts would have
disappeared, and none of the new unpredictability would exist.
One of the untoward consequences of Crawford is that it
seems to have rendered nugatory in criminal cases the
December 2000 amendment to Rule 803(6). 17 That reform was
designed to allow a business record custodian to submit an
Most federal
affidavit in lieu of in-court testimony. 18
prosecutors’ offices now believe that such affidavits are
“testimonial” and have therefore returned to calling custodians
to testify. Is it conceivable that such a sensible evidentiary
16

Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 137 (1999) (plurality opinion).
FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
18
See FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note (2000 amendments) (“The
amendment provides that the foundation requirements of Rule 803(6) can be satisfied
under certain circumstances without the expense and inconvenience of producing timeconsuming foundation witnesses. Under current law, courts have generally required
foundation witnesses to testify.”).
17
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reform is unconstitutional? As Professor Capra pointed out at
the symposium, Judge Weinstein authored a lucid opinion,
prior to Crawford, upholding the constitutionality of such a
business record certification. 19 As we say in Brooklyn, if it is
good enough for Judge Weinstein, it is good enough for me. Yet
one can read Crawford to undermine Judge Weinstein’s
sensible conclusion.
IV.

LOOKING FORWARD

Where are we headed? It seems certain that Justice
Scalia eschewed a more precise definition of “testimonial” so as
not to fracture his majority. Pre-Crawford, Justice Thomas
and Justice Breyer inveighed against Roberts, 20 but their
definitions of “testimonial” may well be different. The federal
circuit courts seem to be moving toward a relatively narrow
definition that limits the term to declarations given in response
to investigatory questioning. 21 A betting person might wager
that defendants will end up with less constitutional protection
than if Roberts had been retained and Lilly strengthened. If so,
Michael Crawford’s win will be other defendants’ loss.

19
United States v. Chan, 680 F. Supp. 521, 522 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (foreign
certification procedure did not violate defendant’s rights).
20
See Lilly, 527 U.S. at 142 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing White, 502 U.S. at
363 (Thomas, J., concurring)) (“At the same time, the current hearsay-based
Confrontation Clause test is arguably too broad . . . . [I]t is debatable whether the
Sixth Amendment principally protects ‘trustworthiness,’ rather than ‘confrontation.’”);
White, 502 U.S. at 365 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]he Confrontation Clause is
implicated by extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are contained in formalized
testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.”).
21
See, e.g., United States v. Hendricks, 395 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 2005),
mandamus denied sub nom. In re Robinson, 132 Fed. Appx. 418 (3d Cir. 2005); Leavitt
v. Arave, 371 F.3d 663, 683 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2540 (2005); Mungo
v. Duncan, 393 F.3d 327, 331-32 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied sub nom. Mungo v. Greene,
125 S. Ct. 1936 (2005).

